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Samuel Kahn Kant’s Theory of Conscience
In this paper I discuss Kant’s theory of conscience. In particular, I explicate the following two claims
that Kant makes in the Metaphysics of Morals: (1) an erring conscience is an absurdity and (2) if an agent
has acted according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that can be required of him/her. I argue that
(1) is a very specific claim that does not bear on the problem of moral knowledge. I argue that (2) rests on a
strongly internalist line of argument.
0 Introduction
Kant makes the following two claims in the second half of theMetaphysics of Morals:
1. I shall here pass over the various divisions of conscience and note only that, as follows from what has
been said, an erring conscience is an absurdity. (6:401)
2. But if someone is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience, then as far as guilt or
innocence is concerned nothing more can be required of him. (6:401)1
The first claim seems to be a denial of the problem of moral knowledge. That is, 1 seems to be
saying that, through conscience, agents have an immediate, intuitive awareness of what is permis-
sible and what is not. It is through conscience that agents judge whether they have fulfilled their
duties. But because an erring conscience is an absurdity, agents must have an immediate, intuitive
awareness of what their duties are by means of conscience.
Based on this reading of 1, 2 is uncontroversial. If an erring conscience is an absurdity, then
it follows that if one is acting in accordance with conscience, one is acting permissibly. But if
one is acting permissibly, then, as far as guilt or innocence is concerned, nothing more can be
required of one. If one is acting permissibly, then one eo ipso is doing what morality requires.
One can understand this argument more clearly by means of the distinction between objective and
1Cf. also, e.g., 6:189, where Kant claims that “more [than acting in accordance with conscience] cannot be required
of a human being”. See also 27:335 and 355.
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subjective rightness.2
Philosophers often distinguish between “objective” and “subjective” senses of “rightness”.
Suppose it is an objective truth that I am obligated to do D. It is possible for me to believe that I am
not obligated to do D, and suppose that in fact I believe that I am not. If this is so and if I do not
do D, then I have not acted objectively rightly but I have acted subjectively rightly. In other words,
accurate beliefs or full information might lead an ideal agent to conclude that action A is the right
one (objective rightness), but given what the actual agent in the context knew and thought, it was
only to be expected that this agent would think B was the right action (subjective rightness). It is
then a separate question, about which there can be disagreement, whether it is culpable not to act
rightly objectively when one acts rightly subjectively. But if 1 is read in the way that I suggested
above (i.e., if 1 is taken to be a denial of the problem of moral knowledge) then the distinction
between objective and subjective rightness implodes; it is not possible for me to believe that I am
not obligated to do D if it is an objective truth that I am obligated to do D.
In this paper, I argue that this is a misreading of these two claims. In particular, I argue that
1 is much more subtle than a denial of the problem of moral knowledge, and I argue that 2 rests
on an appeal to an internalist line of argument. The paper is divided into three sections. In the
first section, I describe the functions of a Kantian faculty of conscience. In the second section, I
explicate 1. I argue that the natural reading of 1 is incorrect; 1 is a very specific claim about a
particular function of conscience and, I argue, Kant gives a plausible defense of it. In the third
section, I explicate 2.
2Kantians might want to substitute ‘permissibility’ for ‘rightness’ to avoid ambiguity; I shall not be talking about
Kant’s duties of right, which are more properly discussed in the context of his Rechtslehre.
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1 Conscience
Kant thinks of conscience as an inner court.3 He often depicts it as a court with a divine tribunal.4
Like a judge in a court, conscience “acquits or declares us to deserve punishment” (27:353).
Now Hill argues that, on Kant’s view, conscience itself punishes.5 Wood argues that, on Kant’s
view, conscience does not and, moreover, cannot punish. According to Wood, a Kantian con-
science cannot punish because an agent cannot punish him/herself.6 The text seems to support
Wood’s reading over Hill’s. In his discussion of criminals, Kant argues that agents cannot punish
themselves. Moreover, Kant does not view the painful feeling that comes with the recognition that
one has violated the moral law as a punishment. At 6:439n, Kant says that conscience judges one
punishable, but he says it leaves to God whether to punish one.
Just as conscience does not punish, conscience does not reward. The only joy that conscience
affords is in avoiding bad actions and, thus, avoiding deserving rightful punishment (6:440). How-
ever, if conscience is to motivate, as Kant suggests that it does at 6:400, Kant’s moral agent must
have a motive to want to avoid deserving punishment. Unlike the motive to want to deserve the
pain or harm involved in actually being punished, having a special motive, quite distinct from this
one, to want to avoid deserving punishment is a significant point in Kant’s moral psychology. I
touch on these issues briefly at the end of this section and, again, at the end of this paper. Nonethe-
less, the only pleasure conscience affords is negative (in the avoidance of pain). Thus Kant makes
the following claim in theMetaphysics of Morals:
It should be noted that when conscience acquits him [i.e., any agent] it can never decide
on a reward (praemium), something gained that was not his before, but can bring with it only
3See, e.g., 5:98; 6:438; 27:295, 351, 353-354 and 572-573.
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rejoicing at having escaped the danger of being found punishable. Hence the blessedness found
in the comforting encouragement of one’s conscience is not positive (joy) but merely negative
(relief from preceding anxiety). . . (6:440)
According to this quotation, a Kantian conscience never rewards or confers happiness; it merely
allows one the relief in having avoided a wrong-doing. However, it is not clear whether Kant is
consistent on this point. At 27:296-297 Kant claims that conscience conveys an “inner joy” at good
actions. One might resolve the textual inconsistency by arguing that the inner joy referred to here
is supposed to be merely negative.
A related worry arises when one considers Kant’s classification of actions. On Kant’s account,
actions are forbidden (blamable), permissible, required (blamable not to do) or meritorious. But
courts tend either to mete out punishment (blame) or to omit to do so (if the verdict is ‘innocent’).
Courts do not offer rewards or declare actions meritorious. Kantian conscience, however, if it were
the sort of tribunal authorized to make the standard ethical judgments Kantian ethics recognizes
for actions, ought to be empowered to declare some actions meritorious and, hence, deserving
of a reward (though of course, as in the case of deserving punishment, conscience itself neither
rewards nor punishes). One might wonder why Kant does not empower conscience to judge actions
meritorious as well as innocent or guilty. Perhaps it is merely an infelicitous feature of his choice of
the idea of conscience as a court, for criminal courts decide only between innocence and deserving
punishment rather than authorize rewards. Alternatively, merit might be registered in the agent’s
consciousness without its being a possible verdict of conscience. Conscience might be thought
of as having to do with whether one has done (or is proposing to do) wrong or has incurred (or
is proposing to incur) guilt but not with whether one’s actions are meritorious; if this is correct,
then one need not deny that agents might be conscious of merit when their actions possess it.
However it is not clear whether any decisive conclusions can be reached here; the texts are silent.
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Moreover, any discussion of these topics would require a thorough investigation of exactly how
Kant’s classification of actions plays out, which is far beyond the scope of the present investigation.
It is (in principle) possible for one to judge another in the way that one’s conscience judges
oneself (provided that one knows all of the other’s relevant beliefs and principles). But a Kantian
conscience is involved only in one’s judging of oneself. I shall return to this point at the end of this
section.
Kant warns against confusing conscience with understanding. He tells us that ”it is understand-
ing, not conscience, which judges whether an action is in general right or wrong” (6:186). Kant’s
particular phraseology here (“in general”) is extremely important. For one thing, it indicates that
Kant does not think that the general duties he enumerates in the Metaphysics of Morals are either
universal or provisionally universal. This interpretation is buoyed up by the presence of casuistical
questions and by the way the examples are set up in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals
(i.e., these examples seem to have agents approaching general duties with the assumption that they
are neither universal nor even provisionally universal).7 For another, it leaves room for individual
judgment (and, thus, error) in judging particular cases. Although the issue of error is discussed
to some extent later in this paper, the status of Kant’s general duties (as universal or provisionally
universal) is beyond my present scope.8 The general idea Kant is expressing in this quotation from
6:186 is that once an action has been subsumed under a principle, it is understanding (rather than
conscience) that is responsible for judging whether that action is in general permissible. For ex-
7Many of Kant’s predecessors and successors ascribe to conscience the functions of resolving cases of conflicting
duties and answering casuistical questions. However, Kant does not do this. For one thing, he argues that conflicts of
obligation are impossible (6:224). For another, he thinks that figuring out whether a particular action is right involves
the faculty of reason rather than of conscience. This is discussed further in the text above.
8However, it is perhaps worth noting that Kant distinguishes between right and ethics in this regard; he argues that
“[in contrast to the doctrine of right], the doctrine of virtue. . . cannot refuse some room for exceptions (latitudinem)”
(6:233). Ethical principles allow for exceptions; principles of right do not.
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ample, it is understanding that is responsible for judging whether suicide is generally permissible
(or whether making a false promise is generally permissible).
Kant also warns against confusing conscience with reason. He tells us that “conscience does
not pass judgment upon actions as cases that stand under the law, for this is what reason does so far
as it is subjectively practical” (6:186). Reason, insofar as it is subjectively practical, is responsible
for judging whether any given action is permissible; this is not a function of conscience. Thus, for
example, it is the function of subjectively practical reason (rather than of conscience) to determine
whether some particular suicide or false promise (or whatever) is permissible. Thus, Kant claims
that agents must “. . . have prior knowledge of the good, if conscience is to judge” (27:356; see also
27:576 and 27:617).
Thus far, I have described what conscience does not do on Kant’s account. Conscience does
not punish, reward, judge others, judge actions as generally permissible or judge whether any
particular action is permissible. Now I turn to Kant’s account of what conscience does do.
There are two passages that are particularly helpful here. The first occurs in the Religion within
the Boundaries of mere Reason. It is as follows:
. . . [in conscience] reason judges itself, whether it has actually undertaken, with all dili-
gence, that examination of actions (whether they are right or wrong) and it calls upon the
human being to witness for or against himself whether this has taken place or not. (6:186)9
The second passage occurs in theMetaphysics of Morals. It is as follows:
. . . conscience is practical reason holding the human being’s duty before him for his acquit-
tal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law.. . . (6:400)
Based on the passage from the Metaphysics of Morals, it seems clear that on Kant’s account
conscience is responsible for judging whether an agent has fulfilled his/her duties in any given
9Cf., e.g., 27:614-615.
6
Samuel Kahn Kant’s Theory of Conscience
instance. Conscience holds an agent’s duty before him/her for acquittal or condemnation in every
case that stands under a law. Once the action has been subsumed under a law and judged to be
permissible or impermissible, conscience appraises the agent in having done (or in proposing to
do) some action. I shall call this the duty function. Kant never uses this term to describe one
of the functions of conscience; I have chosen it because it reflects that which conscience does on
Kant’s account. Conscience fulfills the duty function insofar as it determines whether an agent has
fulfilled his/her duty in any given instance and, thus, whether an agent is blameworthy.
Now before turning to the passage from the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason, it
is useful to address a potential objection. It might be objected that Kant is profoundly pessimistic
about agents’ abilities to assess whether they are behaving permissibly. But if agents are opaque
to themselves in this way, then the practicability of the duty function is highly attenuated. So
either I am misinterpreting Kant in assigning the duty function to conscience, or Kant’s theory of
conscience does not fit well with a view that seems deeply rooted in his philosophy. And because
what I am calling the duty function is taken right from the surface of the passage from 6:400, it
looks like the conclusion that is unavoidably forced out is that Kant’s theory of conscience does
not fit well with a view that seems deeply rooted in his philosophy.
However, closer inspection reveals that this objection is based on a misunderstanding of that
about which Kant is pessimistic. Kant is not pessimistic about agents’ abilities to assess whether
they are behaving permissibly. Rather, he is pessimistic about agents’ abilities to determine in any
given instance what their motives are: whether they are acting from duty or whether they are acting
from prudence (or both). In other words, Kant is pessimistic about agents’ abilities to determine
what their dispositions are, not about their abilities to determine whether, for example, the actions
they are about to perform are permissible. This is made clear at the beginning of part II of the
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Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant claims that “although many things are done
in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done
strictly from duty, so as to have a moral worth” (4:406). So there is no deep tension here between
Kant’s theory of conscience and his beliefs about the opacity of agents. In other words, the duty
function assesses whether one has acted in accordance with duty. But it is possible to do this
without determining whether one has acted from duty. So the objection is unfounded. Let us now
turn to the passage from the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason to see what Kant says
about the role of conscience there.
The passage from the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason is more subtle than the
passage from theMetaphysics of Morals. Kant tells us that conscience determines whether an agent
actually has undertaken to examine his/her actions in any given instance. Moreover, it determines
whether an agent has done so with “due diligence”.
Kant’s use of the term ‘due diligence’ here is puzzling. This is a legal notion, and it usually is
involved with judgments about negligence. The term suggests that there is some standard according
to which an agent either uses “enough” or “not enough” care in examining his/her action in any
given instance. One way to cash this out would be to say that the more “perfect” a duty is, the more
careful one must be in determining whether a given action is a permissible exception to the rule.10
At times, Kant indicates that the duty to exercise due diligence is quite strict. For example, the
following passage can be found in his Lectures on Ethics:
Nobody can take a thing to be right or wrong, even when probability is present, so long as
he cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. (27:615; see also 6:185-186)
But it is not clear why Kant takes such a strong line and it is not clear that a Kantian ethics would
10Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is notoriously difficult and, as already noted, far beyond
the scope of this paper.
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need to absorb this part of Kant’s ethics. It seems like the line of thought expressed in this quotation
would make it very difficult to get anything done, for it is rare that agents are in a position to dismiss
the possibility of the opposite of one of their beliefs.11 I shall take no settled position here. It might
be the case that these references to probability are references to the Jesuit doctrine of probabilism,
which was well-known during Kant’s time through Pascal’s harsh critique of it in the Provincial
Letters.12
According to probabilism, in difficult cases, cases in which one is uncertain about what to do,
one may follow a doctrine that is probable. Now the proponents of probabilism do not spell out
precisely what counts as “probable” and it is difficult to know exactly what they had in mind when
one gets down to the nitty-gritty. Obviously I cannot try to settle exegetical questions here about
the intentions of authors like de Medina. But one thing that is notable about this doctrine is that
one is permitted to follow an opinion that is probable even if the opposite opinion is more probable.
Thus, for example, it seems that according to probabilists it would be “permissible” to leave my
umbrella at home even if there is a 75% chance of rain.13
It seems unlikely that Kant would subscribe to this position, especially given what he says
11Strictly speaking, this is somewhat misleading. It is not rare for agents to be in a position to dismiss some line of
action as clearly wrong. For instance, it clearly would be wrong for someone to steal his/her neighbor’s recycling bins
because s/he has decided to start a collection; it is easy to dismiss the thought that this would be permissible. Even
more obviously, it clearly would be wrong to shoot one of my classmates because s/he is sitting in the seat in which
I usually sit. Millions of vicious or thoughtless actions I never even consider would be dismissed easily as wrong if
I did consider them. But in cases that are likely to trouble one’s conscience, it is not rare to remain unsure whether
one has done the right thing. Sometimes conscientious reflection leads to certainty, as when one sees clearly that one’s
temptation to think a certain action is OK is a result of self-deceptive self-love or some other corrupt mental process.
But conscience sometimes wrestles with hard decisions and a conscientious agent might never be sure whether this
or that course is the right one. Kant, it seems, likes to think that if an agent is sufficiently conscientious, s/he always
will arrive at a point where s/he can be morally comfortable with what s/he does, even if it is the hard choice from a
prudential standpoint. But I think many of us regard that as a moralist’s illusion.
12In Kant’s discussion of these issues at 6:185-186, he mentions probabilism explicitly. Probabilism is also men-
tioned explicitly in the Lectures on Ethics only a few pages after the passage quoted above (see 27:622).
13‘Permissible’ is in scare quotes here because this is not a moral question. But hopefully the idea is clear.
9
Samuel Kahn Kant’s Theory of Conscience
in his Lectures on Ethics. But the point is that his remarks in the Lectures on Ethics might be a
reaction to probabilism, perhaps even a reaction inspired by the work of Pascal, who claimed that
probabilism leads to moral lassitude. Perhaps in his more reflective moments, Kant would have
taken a middle road. For example, he might have adhered to the view that when one is uncertain
about what to do, one ought to do that which has a higher probability of being right. There is no
way to tell, and here I shall follow Kant’s prescription insofar as “probability is present”: I remain
in aporia with regard to what Kant’s position is about what counts as due in due diligence.
Regardless of what one makes of Kant’s discussion of due diligence, it is clear that the function
he is ascribing to conscience in this passage is not the same as the duty function. I shall call this
function the moral reflexivity function. ‘Moral reflexivity function’ is not Kant’s term; this is my
term to describe one of the functions that Kant ascribes to the faculty of conscience. Conscience
performs the moral reflexivity function insofar as it determines whether an agent has examined
his/her actions to determine whether they are permissible. If an agent has examined his/her actions
in this way, the moral reflexivity function answers in the positive; if an agent has not examined
his/her actions in this way, the moral reflexivity function answers in the negative. Even factoring
in Kant’s remarks about due diligence, the moral reflexivity function is still a simple binary.
I shall explain the distinction between the duty function and the moral reflexivity function at
greater length in the next section. But before I do that, I need to make one point about the account
I already have given more explicit.
I pointed out above that conscience does not judge others. However, both the duty function
and the moral reflexivity function, as I describe them, in principle could be exercised on someone
else. By eavesdropping on someone else and his/her actions, I could make a judgment whether
s/he is doing the thing s/he ought to do (the duty function) or whether s/he has exercised due care
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in making the judgment that s/he ought to do it (the moral reflexivity function). But it is essential
to Kant’s conception of conscience that whatever judgment it makes it makes only about the agent
him/herself. This is what Kant means when he says that in conscience “reason judges itself”; he
means the individual’s (practical) reason regarded as the seat of the individual’s moral personality.
This is what he is driving at also when he says that conscience is practical reason “holding the
human being’s duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation”. The judgment in question is
essentially self-reflexive. Nobody can be another’s conscience.
This self-relatedness is closely connected to the fact that conscience involves a feeling (6:400).
A feeling for Kant is not cognitive; it is only the subject’s awareness of its own subjective state in
a way that motivates or tends to motivate. The judgment conscience makes is a judgment about
oneself and it involves either a pleasure (although only a negative one, that one is not guilty) or
displeasure (that one is guilty) in performing a certain action. It is via these feelings that conscience
motivates. I now turn to Kant’s discussion of errors of conscience.
2 Errors of conscience
In the introduction of this paper, I distinguished between objective rightness and subjective right-
ness. The basic idea is that if (and only if) an agent performs an action that is in accordance with
his/her (subjective) principles, s/he is acting in a way that is subjectively right; if (and only if) an
agent performs an action that is in accordance with principles that are objectively correct, s/he is
acting in a way that is objectively right.
As pointed out in the previous section, conscience is not involved directly in determining
whether a given action is permissible. Whether a given action is permissible is determined by an
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agent’s reason and understanding. Conscience answers the duty function and the moral reflexivity
function in accordance with an agent’s subjective principles; conscience functions in accordance
with an agent’s prior knowledge of the good.
Because different agents have different principles (the USA, for example, is a pluralistic soci-
ety), different agents will be acquitted or condemned by their respective consciences for different
things. Bertrand Russell had no qualms about living with a partner despite not being married. A
member of the religious right might not be able to behave like Bertrand Russell without being
condemned by conscience.
Now, as pointed out in the introduction, at 6:401 Kant claims that conscience cannot err. Hill
interprets Kant’s claim that conscience cannot err as the following claim: agents never make a
mistake in determining whether they are guilty of performing acts-as-they-perceive-them that are
not in accordance with their moral-principles-as-they-accept them.14 That is, Hill takes Kant to
be saying that agents never err in assessing whether they have acted subjectively rightly (the duty
function). Call this Hill’s reading.15 In the introduction, I argued that the most natural reading
(which I shall refer to as such) of Kant’s claim is as a denial of the problem of moral knowledge.
That is, I argued that the most natural reading of Kant’s claim is that agents’ principles are always
objectively correct; there is no gap between subjective and objective rightness.16 In this section, I
shall argue that both Hill’s interpretation and the most natural reading of Kant’s claim at 6:401 are
misinterpretations of the text.
However, it is worth pointing out that if one looks at the Lectures on Ethics, one sees that Kant
14[5], 348p3.
15It should be noted that Hill is not the only commentator who subscribes to what I am calling Hill’s reading. For
example, Skorupski also subscribes to this reading (see [7], 555p3).
16This reading is taken by Hardwig. Hardwig argues, first, that on Kant’s account there is no problem of moral
knowledge ([2], 285p1) and, second, that Kant is forced to adopt this position on pain of contradiction ([2], 287p3-4).
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is not consistent on this point about errors of conscience. At 27:297, Kant argues that conscience
cannot err on the grounds that conscience is an instinct and thus must be distinguished from the
faculty of speculative judgment because it is not free. Presumably the idea is that only free faculties
(such as the faculty of speculative judgment) can make errors. At 27:615, Kant takes the claim that
conscience cannot err as a starting point in order to adduce its function. At still other places, Kant
admits explicitly that conscience can err (see, e.g., 27:42 and 354-355).17 I shall take the claims
from Kant’s published writings, especially those from 6:401 and 8:268, as his genuine position.
At 6:401, Kant is not claiming that conscience cannot act in accordance with bad principles
(i.e., that agents cannot perform actions that are subjectively right but not objectively right — the
natural reading) or that agents never err in assessing subjective rightness (Hill’s reading). On the
contrary, Kant’s claim, taken in context, is as follows:
. . . while I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective judgment as to whether some-
thing is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgment as to whether I have
submitted it to practical reason (here in its role as judge) for such a judgment; for if I could be
mistaken in that, I would have made no practical judgment at all, and in that case there would
be neither truth nor error. (6:401)
Kant here admits that agents can be mistaken in their judgments as to whether something is a duty.
This immediately puts the natural reading to rest.18 Moreover, a close look at this passage also
shows why Hill’s interpretation is incorrect. Kant’s claim is that agents cannot be mistaken in their
judgments as to whether they have submitted something to practical reason at all rather than about
17One must remember that the lecture notes were not written by Kant himself. The lecture notes were written by
Kant’s students. Moreover, they were not written during the lecture course (as students take notes today). Rather, they
were written down from memory after the lecture was over. (No doubt, they contain extrapolations where memories
were missing.) Given these facts about the Lectures on Ethics and given the fact that the various claims about con-
science made in the Lectures on Ethics are inconsistent, I hope I shall be excused for not looking as closely as one
might at these various claims.
18Cf also 27:42, where Kant distinguishes between two different kinds of errors of conscience, logical errors and
moral errors, and 27:354, where Kant allows for “false principia of conscience”.
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whether agent’s can be mistaken in judging that their action is in accordance with their principles.
That is, Kant’s claim is about the moral reflexivity function rather than the duty function (pace
Hill).19 The moral reflexivity function is not the same as the duty function. The moral reflexivity
function is like the bell on a microwave: when it goes off, it indicates that practical reason has
been employed. Of course, it is not always the case that the moral reflexivity function is employed
when practical reason is employed. One might arrive at a practical judgment (e.g., “I ought to X”)
without having exercised due diligence in doing so but without answering the moral reflexivity
function, either. The point is that if the moral reflexivity function is exercised, then practical
reason has been employed. The converse of this is probably false.
Regardless of whether it is true, when Kant claims that conscience cannot err, he is making
a very specific claim. This very specific claim is independent of whether conscience can err in
the duty function or whether agents can adopt false principles. In order to see this, consider the
following. The moral reflexivity function answers the following question: have I submitted action
X to my moral principles? The duty function answers the following question: in performing action
X, did I (or shall I) be acting in a way that is deserving of punishment? In answering the second
question, the agent determines whether his/her action is in accordance with his/her principles —
an agent assesses subjective rightness. But these two questions are fundamentally different. Kant’s
claim is about the first question rather than about the second, so Kant leaves open the possibility of
an error of judgment (and thus an error in assessing subjective rightness, the kind of error that Hill
argues Kant is trying to rule out). Presumably if an agent can answer the duty function question,
19It is perhaps notable that in Hill’s discussion of Kant’s conception of conscience, he does not mention anything
like the moral reflexivity function. He mentions something like what I have called the duty function. He also spends
a lot of time on due diligence. However, the moral reflexivity function does not make its way into his discussion
(moreover, because due diligence is a proper part of the moral reflexivity function, his discussion of due diligence is
somewhat dissatisfying).
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then the agent ought to answer the moral reflexivity function question in the affirmative (I come
back to this shortly). This does not mean that the agent actually does answer the moral reflexivity
function question in the affirmative if s/he can answer the duty function question. The idea is that
there is a sort of conceptual priority to the moral reflexivity function. If an agent has not submitted
X to moral principles, there is no way for him/her to determine whether X is in accordance with
them. But the answer to the duty function question is independent of the answer to the moral
reflexivity function question. The point is that the moral reflexivity function is not the same as the
duty function, and it is only the moral reflexivity function that Kant declares to be incapable of
error.
In order to make Kant’s claim stand out as clearly as possible, I would like to spend some
time distinguishing some of the different things that might be called an “erring conscience” in
addition to Hill’s errors of subjective rightness and the natural reading’s objectively bad principles.
For example, one might have a fanatical conscience, a conscience that strews one’s path with
“mantraps” (6:409). An agent might be said to have a fanatical conscience if s/he thinks duty
constrains him/her at every point, making issues of prudence into issues of morality. Thus, an
agent who judges him/herself morally guilty for eating meat for dinner rather than fish despite
knowing that fish is much healthier might be said to have a fanatical conscience. This is not to
say that there could not be moral reasons for eating fish rather than meat; it is to say that someone
who condemns him/herself for eating meat on one occasion and who condemns him/herself on that
occasion because meat is not as healthy as fish has a fanatical conscience.
Similarly, one might have a morbid conscience. An agent might be said to have a morbid
conscience if s/he has a conscience that makes him/her feel (morbidly) guilty all the time. A
fanatical conscience can go hand in hand with a morbid conscience if an agent thinks s/he has
15
Samuel Kahn Kant’s Theory of Conscience
duties s/he does not have and then feels guilty for not performing them. But the two are not the
same. An agent can feel morbidly guilty without thinking s/he has violated a specific duty; s/he
can feel morbidly guilty owing to the sins of his/her ancestors or for simply having sexual desires,
even if s/he does not act on them. And an agent with a fanatical conscience might think s/he is
constrained by duty at every point but not feel guilty at all if s/he actually performs all his/her
imagined duties.
Alternatively, one might be said to have a rigoristic conscience if one sticks strictly and un-
thinkingly to a set of moral rules without regard for whether there might be mitigating conditions.
An agent might be said to have a rigoristic conscience if s/he lives in a way resembling the way
that Kant is usually caricatured; e.g., so strict in his walks that his neighbors can set their watches
by him.
An agent might be said to have an erring conscience if s/he is very vicious. That is, an agent
who never pays any heed to his/her conscience might be said to have an erring conscience. One
might think that very vicious agents somehow must have silenced their consciences (how else
could they go on like that?), and this kind of erring conscience might be called a silent conscience.
One might be said to have an erring conscience if one fails in the kind of diligence described in
the previous section. This might be called a negligent conscience, and an example of a negligent
conscience would be someone who does not check to make sure that s/he is holding a bee bee gun
rather than a rifle and accidentally shoots his/her friend to death in a “prank” on April 1st.20 An
agent might be said to have an ignorant conscience if s/he does not know what to do in a given
situation and, without an expert to consult, chooses blindly and wrongly.
The list could go on. All of these things might be thought of as different kinds of errors of
20A case like this recently (today’s date is 12.01.2010) was reported in the news.
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conscience. However, as the text makes clear, Kant is not talking about any of these things in
claiming that an erring conscience is an absurdity. Kant does think that some agents strew their
paths with man-traps (what I called having a fanatical conscience); he also thinks that some agents
feel morbidly guilty all the time (a morbid conscience); he thinks that some agents are inflexible
in their application of rules (a rigoristic conscience); and he thinks that it is possible to pay no
heed to conscience (a vicious agent); he thinks that it is possible to have what I described as a
negligent conscience (Kant illustrates a negligent conscience by describing an inquisitor); and it
would be difficult to make sense of Kant’s casuistical questions in the Metaphysics of Morals, the
answers to which do not seem to be intended to be self-evident, if he ruled out the possibility of an
ignorant conscience.21 Kant’s claim about an erring conscience is very specific, and the specificity
of his claim is brought out even more clearly in his discussion at 8:268. At 8:268 Kant makes the
following claim:
. . . an erring conscience is an absurdity; and, if there is such a thing, then we could never be
certain we have acted rightly, since even the judge in the last instance can still be in error. I can
indeed err in the judgment in which I believe to be right, for this belongs to the understanding
which alone judges objectively (rightly or wrongly); but in the judgment whether I in fact
believe to be right (or merely pretend it) I absolutely cannot be mistaken, for this judgment —
or rather this proposition —merely says that I judge the object in such-and-such a way.(8:268)
In this passage, Kant argues that agents can be mistaken about whether X is permissible, but he
argues that they cannot be mistaken about whether they believe X to be permissible. Again, this
gives decisive evidence against the natural reading discussed in the introduction; Kant clearly
allows for the possibility of subjective rightness not being in agreement with objective rightness.
The distinction that Kant is making in this passage is, I think, roughly analogous to what he says
in the passage from the Metaphysics of Morals. What is perhaps of note in this passage is the
21Interestingly, Kant does not think that what I described as a silent conscience is possible. However, as the text
makes clear, this is not what he is referring to when he claims that an erring conscience is an absurdity.
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apparent inconsistency between the first and the second sentences.
In the first sentence, Kant tells us that if there were such a thing as an erring conscience (there
is no such thing; such a thing is an absurdity. But if there were such a thing), then agents never
could be certain that they have acted rightly. Agents never could be certain that they have acted
rightly because if there were such a thing as an erring conscience, then even the judge in the last
instance can be in error.
In the second sentence, Kant tells us that agents can be in error with regard to judgments
about whether some action is right. This sort of judgment belongs to the understanding and the
understanding is fallible. Indeed, it is precisely because of this that subjective rightness does not
need to be in agreement with objective rightness (on Kant’s account).
But now it looks like there is a problem, for if agents can err in judgments about whether some
action is right, then it is difficult to see how agents ever could be certain that they have acted
rightly. Kant seems to be telling us precisely that the judge in the last instance can be in error.
Kant’s argument seems to implode; so far from showing that an erring conscience is an absurdity,
the second sentence seems to warrant the conclusion (by modus tollens) that an erring conscience
is a real possibility.
This inconsistency is of such numbing grossness (to coin a phrase) that it calls for some recon-
sideration, for Kant’s language suggests that he thinks the second sentence supports the first. Thus,
he must not take infallibility in judgments of understanding to be required to avoid the absurdity
pointed to in the first sentence. Kant’s use of the term ‘last instance’ here is very significant. It
shows he is using the court of judgment idea and using features of it (viz., the idea of a court of
last instance) that need explanation. I think the issues Kant is raising in the first sentence have to
do more with bindingness and authority than they have to do with “error” in the way we normally
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think of it. I shall return to this in the next section.
For now, I simply point out that in the second sentence, Kant tells us that agents cannot be
mistaken in the exercise of the moral reflexivity function (at least insofar as that function is stripped
of consideration of due diligence). Agents cannot be in error in the judgment of whether they
have submitted something to practical reason in its role as judge; agents cannot be in error in the
judgment about whether they believe (or merely pretend to believe) that something is right. I shall
discuss the relevance of this in the next section when I come back to the notion of a conscience as
a court of last instance.
3 Acting according to conscience
Given what Kant means by 1 (the claim that an erring conscience is an absurdity), 2 (the claim
that agents who act in accordance with conscience have done all that they ought) is all the more
striking. That is, given that Kant does not deny the problem of moral knowledge — given that
he, in fact, explicitly affirms it in the discussion of an erring conscience — it is striking that Kant
adopts such a strong theory of conscience.
In the introduction to this paper, I made the following argument. If an erring conscience is
an absurdity, then agents who act according to conscience eo ipso act objectively rightly. And if
an agent acts objectively rightly, then the agent has done all that morality can require of him/her.
But Kant cannot make this argument. As was seen in the previous section, Kant does not think
that if an erring conscience is an absurdity, then agents who act according to conscience eo ipso
act objectively rightly. According to Kant, an agent might act according to conscience but act
objectively wrongly if his/her principles are bad. In such a case, the agent has made an error of
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understanding. Such errors are possible. The point is that they are not culpable.22 In the remainder
of this section, I shall give two examples to help clarify the issues on the table and I shall discuss
what I take to be Kant’s argument for 2 (insofar as he has one).
The first example is not one in which the agent has bad principles. Suppose that X goes out to
lunch with Y but that X forgets her wallet. X asks Y to spot her ten dollars to pay for lunch and
she promises to repay it at lunch next week. Ten dollars is not a huge amount of money, and one
might suppose that X and Y are good enough friends that this is not such an extraordinary event. X
intends to pay back the money. She even writes the following down in her planner: bring an extra
ten dollars to lunch next week to give to Y. But X’s memory is pretty bad and her handwriting is
even worse, and X forgets the promise. There is nothing nasty here. The example is a one-time
event, it is not a chronic or unconscious habit. Nonetheless, some might feel queasy saying that
something like forgetting can alter the moral landscape. Presumably X is behaving in accordance
with her conscience in this instance; if one ascribes to 2, then X has done nothing wrong.23
The second example is one in which the agent has bad principles. Compare, again, Russell and
the member of the religious right. The principles of Russell and the member of the religious right
are probably diametrically opposed on many issues. I shall not give a specific example of a bad
principle. But the basic point to be made is that probably some of Russell’s principles are good
and some are bad, and the same goes for the member of the religious right. I take it as given that at
22Cf. 27:354-355, where Kant makes the following claim: “he who acts according to an errant conscience is acting
conscientiously and if he does so, his action might be defective, but [it] cannot be imputed to him as a crime” (clearly
Kant is using ‘errant conscience’ in a different (less technical, less highly theoretical, more popular) sense here. In
using the term ‘errant conscience’, he is referring to the fact that the judgment of understanding that what one does
is right might be mistaken. This passage as a whole upholds his consistent view throughout – namely, that an agent
cannot be blamed for doing something if s/he acts conscientiously).
23This is not to say that X would not be behaving wrongly if, once reminded of the ten dollars by Y, she were to
act as though she now owed nothing. It is merely to say that having forgotten about it, X does nothing wrong in not
bringing the ten dollars the following week.
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least some of either Russell’s or the religious right member’s principles are bad, for some of their
principles are opposed and, thus, some of them must be bad. If one ascribes to 2, then, insofar as
they act in accordance with their principles, both Russell and the member of the religious right are
behaving permissibly.24
I turn now to the argument that comes closest to reaching the claim that if an agent has acted
according to his/her conscience, then, as far as morality is concerned, s/he has done all that s/he
ought. At 6:402, immediately after making this claim, Kant argues as follows:
. . . when it comes, or has come, to a deed, conscience speaks involuntarily and unavoidably.
Therefore, to act in accordance with conscience cannot itself be a duty; for if it were, there
would have to be yet a second conscience in order for one to become aware of the act of the
first. (6:402)
It is tempting to read this passage as appealing to the following line of thought: if X is a judgment
of conscience but the agent does not follow it, then one must suppose a second conscience that
overruled X. But then the first judgment was not a judgment of conscience at all. The idea is not
that there could be a second conscience, it is that if something played this role, then the thing called
‘conscience’ (i.e., the thing that made X, the first judgment of conscience) was not conscience at
all. So there is only conscience, no second conscience. In other words, an agent, in exercising
conscience, necessarily decides to act in accordance with it. If s/he does not so act, then s/he did
not exercise (or not really exercise) the function of conscience at all.
The trouble with this argument is that rather than explaining the text, it goes straight against
it. Kant admits twice in the passage leading up to this quotation that it is possible for an agent to
24This is not to say that the forming of those principles is permissible. It is to say that acting in accordance with
the principles once they have been formed is permissible. In any given instance, I might decide that I have accepted
such and such principle on the basis of customary morality but now, as judged by conscience, I judge myself (and feel)
guilty in following it – which presumably would lead me to repudiate it and follow a different principle even though it
is not conscience itself that picks principles. The point is that as long as I followed this principle conscientiously, my
behavior was not culpable.
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“pay no heed” to the voice of conscience. Thus, the claim that an agent, in exercising conscience,
necessarily decides to act in accordance with it is false on Kant’s view. So this cannot be Kant’s
argument.
The idea seems to be, rather, that conscience is ultimately binding in the sense that a judgment
of conscience provides an agent with motivation to do something that s/he might not have been mo-
tivated to do otherwise. That is, conscience motivates agents to act in accordance with it directly;
Kantian conscience does not motivate by appeal to something else, such as the prospect of an af-
terlife or divine punishment. Of course, an agent might not do that which conscience provides the
motivation for the agent to do; agents might not do that which they ought. But conscience speaks
unavoidably and unasked, and agents are always motivated to comply (even when they choose not
to). Moreover (and this is where the bindingness comes in), in any given instance in which the
judgment of conscience weighs in favor of doing X, the agent ought to X; that is constitutive of
conscience. There can be no duty to comply with conscience because this would make no sense;
it would mean that there would be a duty to do one’s duty, which immediately would generate an
infinite regress (if it is the case that for all duties X there is a duty to do X, then there is a duty to
do X. But then there is a duty to do the duty to do X. And if that is the case, then there is a duty to
do the duty to do the duty to do X. Etc.). Let me explain.
On the face of it, if an agent can fail to heed conscience, it looks like there could and should
be a duty to heed it, and this could be described as a duty to act in accordance with it. That is,
if agents cannot fail to heed conscience (if an agent, in exercising conscience, necessarily decides
to act in accordance with it), then, because ought implies can, it is not the case that one ought
to heed conscience (by modus tollens). But agents can fail to heed conscience, so a duty to heed
conscience is not precluded by appeal to “ought implies can”. Moreover, if an agent fails to heed
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conscience, s/he (eo ipso) is doing something that s/he ought not to do. So an agent ought to heed
conscience, so there is a duty to heed conscience. What is going on?
What Kant seems to be saying is that there is no duty to heed conscience over and above the
duty to do X. That is, if an agent’s conscience would condemn him/her for omitting X, then the
agent has a duty. The agent has a duty to do X. But the agent does not have a further duty to heed
conscience and, thus, to do X. There is one duty in this case, and it is the duty to do X. This might
be described as a duty to heed conscience insofar as there is a duty to do something and if one does
not do that thing, then one will not be heeding conscience. But what Kant is saying is that there is
no duty to heed conscience in the sense of a duty to do the duty to do X or a (logically posterior)
duty to do that which one (logically prior) ought to do. Plainly, such a duty would generate an
infinite regress of the type described, and this might be what Kant is getting at in the passage
quoted.
The trouble with this argument is that it goes precisely nowhere in explaining why Kant thinks
that an agent who acts according to conscience eo ipso has behaved permissibly. I think the ex-
planation of how Kant uses the notion of a court of last instance in the passage explored in the
previous section is essential to tying together all of these issues with why Kant thinks some kinds
of error (viz., errors of understanding, which might result in a gap between subjective rightness and
objective rightness) are irrelevant and why some kinds of error (viz., errors in the moral reflexiv-
ity function) are absurd. Clearly in the real world, courts of last instance (e.g., the U.S. Supreme
Court) can err. But the legal system must treat their judgments as finally valid, even though inde-
pendent agents might think that these judgments are (in some instances) monstrous. I think Kant’s
idea is that conscience serves for a moral agent in some such “last instance” function.
This means that if an agent acts according to his/her conscience, then the agent has done all
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that can be expected of him/her in the sense that s/he must be judged by him/herself (and should
be judged by others) as doing what s/he ought as far as moral accountability is concerned. I think
Kant’s view is the following: To suppose that there could be no “court of last instance” in this
sense, that I could have made as good a judgment as was possible for me about whether I am guilty
or innocent in doing A and yet not have my judgment be binding, so that I honestly might think
that I am innocent even though really I am guilty – this would mean that no agent ever could be in
a position to be finally responsible or accountable.
Analogously, to assume a judicial system in which there is no court of last instance whose
judgment counts as legally valid is to assume a judicial system that is incapable of performing its
essential function. In both cases, agents could revisit the question later. In the legal case, they could
not reverse the judgment of last instance as far as its effect is concerned (at least on the specific
case under review, although they might on later cases, as when the Supreme Court reverses itself);
in the moral case, they could not judge the agent blameworthy for having done the thing (even if
the action is judged objectively wrong). Even if the agent him/herself later decides that what s/he
did was objectively wrong, Kant thinks s/he should not blame him/herself for having done it if s/he
was judged not guilty in doing it at the time by a judgment of his/her conscience.
This explains why Kant tells us that agents cannot be mistaken in the exercise of the moral
reflexivity function. If agents could be in error about this, then the idea of conscience as a “court
of last instance” would make no sense. This idea would make no sense because this just is part of
the judgment that has finality in the sense just described.
The basic point is that agents must take the judgments of conscience (as the court of last in-
stance) to be authoritative (even when they do not act accordingly), just as a criminal must take
the law as authoritative even when s/he breaks it, and even when those judgments (unbeknownst
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to the agent) reflect false principles, just as when the Supreme Court issues a decision with which
one disagrees. If they do not do this, then their autonomy is undermined in the sense that they are
not capable of being self-governing agents. Thus, if agents did not take conscience to be a court of
last instance, they would not be in a position to be finally responsible or accountable.
As a textual argument, this seems to me to be the best one can do. The notion of conscience
is thus seen to be central to Kant’s theory. However, I suspect that those who are not already
sympathetic to Kant’s project will not like this argument. I suspect that those who are not already
sympathetic to Kant’s project will not accept the idea that self-governance and, thus, conscience
as a court of last instance is required for being finally accountable; they even might argue that the
concept of self-governance itself is an oxymoron.
Perhaps Kant knew this already, and perhaps this is why Kant does not try to argue for 2. 2 is
a starting point of Kant’s theory rather than an ending point. What is clear is that Kant thinks that
agents can adopt false principles of conscience; subjective rightness and objective rightness can
come apart; and, according to Kant, if an agent follows his/her conscience, then s/he has done all
that s/he ought as far as morality is concerned.25
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